Chapter 6

Legislative Recruitment in Mexico

Joy Langston

I. Introduction.

This chapter will examine how parties in Mexico choose their candidates and how these methods have changed over time. We find that despite operating in the same institutional environment, the three most important parties - the once-hegemonic Party of the Institutional Revolution (PRI), the center-right National Action Party (PAN) and the center-left Party of the Democratic Revolution (PRD) - deal with the challenges of candidate selection in different ways, leading one to believe that constitutional and electoral institutions alone cannot explain candidate selection in Mexico. The nomination methods used by the three parties can be largely understood by looking at three factors: first, the party's organizational background before the onset of democratization; second, the effects of electoral competition and the dilemmas this creates in a federal system; and third, whether the selection in question is for a plurality or proportional seat.

Because Mexico has undergone a prolonged transition in the last decade, the parties are reacting to their new institutional and competitive context in new ways; thus, the issue of why and how parties change their formal rules is a more important issue here than perhaps in other nations in Latin America, whose parties have not changed selection rules significantly in several years. For this reason, the chapter deals with statutory rules changes more than the problem of the policy consequences of candidate selection and recruitment. By focusing on the whys and hows of candidate selection per se, we are able to understand the internal dilemmas of party organization and how parties are reacting to democratic transition in Mexico.

In Mexico, little work has been done on why parties change their rules; in fact, there is little recent work on nomination procedures as such.\(^1\) If we assume that statutory rules are valuable resources to actors that allow them access to resources and determine beneficial outcomes, then one should expect that they would be costly to change (Koelbe 1992: 52). Yet, in the typical literature on candidate selection (Epstein 1980; Gallagher and

\(^1\)
Marsh 1988, Gallagher 1980; Hazan 2002), we find few testable hypotheses to explain when different kinds of parties in the same institutional settings exhibit different selection techniques, and why party leaders choose to transform these rules. Austin Ranney writes, “The most vital and hotly contested factional disputes in any party are the struggles that take place over the choice of its candidates: for what is at stake in such a struggle, as the opposing sides well know, is nothing less than control of the core of what the party stands for and does (Ranney 1981: 103).” The actual form of candidate selection can tell us a great deal about the internal life of the party; whether it is nationally centralized and hierarchical, like the PRI; whether it has a strong state-based organization that is mostly respected by a national leadership, like the PAN; or whether it is led by a charismatic national leadership with weaker state organizations, like the PRD. And changes to these selection methods can illustrate how parties react to transformations in the political environment in which they must work.

Candidate selection can be categorized along two important dimensions: the level at which nominations are decided, and the level of openness in who is able to participate in these decisions. One important discussion in the literature revolves around the level at which nominations are made is related to the type of electoral system. Czudnowski (1975:221) argues “The party selection is closely related to the electoral system. When a candidate has to be elected by a local or regular constituency, he will tend to be selected by the local or regional party organization.” However, more than ten years later, Gallagher and Marsh (1988) rejected this correlation, because they found no empirical support for it. Finally, Norris (1998) declares that due to a host of new empirical studies, one can safely assert that there is a relation between electoral rules and the level at which nominations take place. However, if this were completely true, then all major parties working within the same set of institutional rules should exhibit similar centralized or decentralized selection methods, which is still not the case in Mexico, most likely because of the 70 year hegemonic control of the political system by the PRI and the slow evolution of democracy.

By looking at the change in nomination methods in a federal system undergoing transition and growing levels of electoral competition, we can examine the different mechanisms that drive party leaders to change or maintain the level at which nominations are decided.

On the openness issue, one could argue, as Epstein does (1980: 210) that primaries
the most open (and decentralized) selection form were instituted because of organizational weakness, that is, outside reformers took advantage of an already decaying organization to weaken the party by taking away its right to control ballot access. However, there is also evidence that primaries are used because of party divisions caused as much by electoral success as by organizational weakness. De Luca, Jones, and Tula (2002: 422-24) test several hypotheses regarding why Argentine parties (whose candidate selection procedures are not regulated by law) choose different methods to nominate candidates in the same institutional environment. They find that divisions within the party organization often lead parties to use primaries. On the other hand, a strong elected official such as a governor will use his leadership to dampen internal conflict and so he should be able to impose or negotiate candidates, making primaries unnecessary. One finds the most closed (and centralized) nomination forms in parties that are either hegemonic or predominant, such as India.

From this literature, one can derive several expectations about how nomination methods can change in a formerly hegemonic political system that has undergone a transition to democracy. We must first examine how candidates were selected under hegemonic conditions to understand how these methods are being transformed. We hypothesize that party selection rules under the authoritarian regime often reflected the organizational birth of the party and the political reality of low to non-existent political competition. As a result, we see highly centralized and closed informal practices in the case of the hegemonic PRI, and decentralized rules in the case of the PAN, a party that was organizationally based on state affiliates. In the PRD, the demands for internal democracy and the inclusion of all groups and parties that originally made up the Center-left party helped dictate open, decentralized nomination methods. In terms of changing rules or informal practices, we should expect to see changes because of a transformation in the electoral environment that affected the ability of each party to win elections, and cause internal ruptures over winning selective benefits. Therefore, in the case of the PRI, as electoral competition rises, party leaders deliver more decision-making power to sub-national actors to recruit local candidates with more ties to the voters. In the case of the PAN, we find that far higher probabilities of winning elected posts caused conflict within party, which led to more even open and decentralized forms of selection. For the PRD, one
finds a surprising evolution of its selection rules: more competitive elections did drive the party to maintain its already decentralized selection rules, but party leaders at the national level attempted with greater frequency to impose party outsiders with better chances of electoral success.

Lastly, the electoral system in Mexico is a mixed form of representation, with both plurality races based in districts with a smaller proportion of both houses of Congress being elected under proportional representation (PR). The pressures of electoral competition are different for plurality and PR candidates, and so we should expect to see different nomination forms for these two types of representation.

We find, then, that party history does matter for setting up rules, but that this is not utterly static and organizations can be transformed in certain contexts, although it is difficult because certain groups that benefited under the old rules will not under the new. Furthermore, competition acts as a detonator, and allows those leaders and groups within the party that are more interested in winning office (rather than maintaining ideological purity or in the case of the PRI, highly centralized control mechanisms) to storm to leadership roles and make selection rules more amenable to office seekers.

While both House and Senate nominations have been transformed in Mexico’s three main parties over the past years, this chapter looks almost exclusively at Senate nomination for several reasons: first, more is known about the Lower House of Congress, so this is a good opportunity to concentrate on relatively unknown territory; second, the Senate is slowly becoming a more important center of policy making; and third, we have data on Senate candidates for both the hegemonic and competitive periods, which doesn’t exist for the Chamber of Deputies. Finally, senatorial nominations demonstrate fully the difficulties and challenges of changing nominations.

In the Introduction to this volume, Siavelis and Morgenstern have devised a set of categories to clarify the types of candidates that are produced from different selection methods, and the likelihood that these different kinds of candidate are better able to meet the rigors of competition elections. The authors hypothesize that closed nomination methods, such as impositions and especially party conventions, in which candidates are selected by either party leaders or party activists are more likely to produce party insider types, while those chosen by registered voters allow party outsiders or constituent servants
to capture nominations. One might expect that candidates who are more popular with a wider array of potential voters, i.e., those chosen in primaries, to be better able to win elections, while those who win nominations in party vote controlled methods would be less so. For Mexico, this argument on legislative recruitment and selection must be tempered by the realities of legislative no-reelection. While senators are elected for six-year terms, for constitutional reasons they cannot run for the same post in the next electoral cycle. This makes the party vote an especially important element in legislative success, even for the Senate. One way of thinking about the importance of the Senate candidates is to look at split ticket voting on the state level over time. We see from Figure 1 that the state level Senate vote does not very significantly from the presidential results in the same state.

While senatorial candidates may not attract voters the way a presidential candidate does, there are only two of them per state and they serve six-year terms. One can place the personal vote for a senator somewhere between the more candidate driven presidential vote and the more party driven deputy election. For this reason, party insiders have the upper hand in legislative recruitment (which is less the case for executive, especially gubernatorial candidates in which candidate identity matters more to voters). A candidate’s identity does matter, but because the parties still control ballot access to most elected positions, a “good” Senate candidate, that is, one with prior elective or governmental experience, is one who usually has been a member of his particular party for several years.

This paper will first look at the electoral system and the specific rules of representation for the Senate are described. Then, each party will be discussed in a separate section. Within each party section, the paper presents a short organizational history, an assessment of how a Senate seat fits within the typical career path of a party politician, a discussion of the formal rules and informal practices of candidate selection, candidate profiles (if available), followed by an explanation of both why and how the parties changed their senate nomination rules and/or practices.

II. Mexico’s Electoral System.

Mexico is a presidential, federal regime with a bi-cameral legislature and 32 states (31 federal entities, with a Federal District, which has similar attributes to a state). Consecutive legislative re-election is constitutionally prohibited, and no president or
governor can ever serve in that same position again, while mayors must wait out at least a term. Mexico’s Senate is made up of 128 representatives who serve six-year terms. Three senators are elected in each state in a closed, two-person ballot. The party that wins the state-wide vote places both of its candidates from the bi-nominal ticket, while the second place finisher places only the first name from its ballot in the Senate. The remaining 32 senators are elected through a closed 32 person national list, with each party placing roughly the same percentage of senators from this list as it won nationally. Thus, the Mexican Senate necessarily includes minority party representation. Furthermore, because of the PR aspect of Senate representation, party leaders can enter the Upper House on a safer track, just like in the Chamber of Deputies. The full set of 128 senators is elected concurrently with the president and the 500 members of the Lower House of Congress, who serve for three years.

III. Candidate Selection Rules and Candidate Profiles in the Three Major Parties.

The PRI.

For over 70 years the PRI was a hegemonic party that acted as the base of support for an inclusive, authoritarian state. All presidents from 1929 until 2000 were members of the PRI or its organizational predecessors. The party was born as an overarching alliance of almost all local and regional parties that had sprung up after the Revolution of 1910. Within a few years, however, it was able to take away the individual identities of these local parties, and under President Lázaro Cárdenas’s guidance, create a mass base that mobilized and integrated millions of Mexicans into the party and political regime (Garrido 1982). One of the greatest struggles of the PRI in its first three decades in power was to centralize power away from the states and up to the federal level and subdue the enormous authority and prerogatives of the governors. The other great conflict was to create both formal and informal rules to maintain the unity and coherence of the wide-flung political coalition.

Candidate selection was one of the most important tools for solving both the centralization and control problems. There was little hope of a political future outside the PRI coalition in an institutional context that constitutionally prohibited consecutive re-
election for legislative posts,\textsuperscript{5} and where PRI leaders could control their ambitious politicians through ballot access. By imposing legislative (and executive) candidates, and without any possibility of a successful “exit” option, party leaders, (including the president) could affect party politicians’ behavior as all PRI hopefuls had to continually leave their elected posts and search out new ones, and could gain access to the extremely valuable PRI ballot only with the agreement of organization’s leaders.

Federalism was largely subverted under this system of control. Each president in turn could practically appoint any governor he chose despite the constitutionally protected elections of state executives, because of the lack of serious opposition challenges and executive control over gubernatorial nominations. Furthermore, the PRI presidents had the informal prerogatives of deposing governors if their performance in office was found wanting. In terms of resources, the Federation made a series of tax agreements over time with the states to take away the administrative burden of tax collection from the sub-national governments and redistribute these resources via federal transfers. The states were left by the early 1980s without self-generated income (Alberto Díaz-Cayeros 1999). The Senate was not a legislative body designed to represent state interests in federal policy making under this atrophied federal system.

Although the Senate in particular and the legislative branch in general had little role to play in policy-making in the highly executive-centered regime, ambitious politicians within the PRI had strong incentives to compete for Senate candidacies. Traditionally, senators were the prime candidates to win nominations to gubernatorial posts, and this tradition continues until today. Sitting governors have always had good reasons to attempt to place their allies in senate candidacies to strengthen their political résumés and groom them as their successors. This was true even under non-competitive conditions when governors had little hope of placing their favored allies as their successors, as each President in turn imposed PRI candidates for governor.
Table 1. Prior Legislative Experience of PRI Governor Nominees

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>n=25</td>
<td>n=53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Federal Deputy</td>
<td>68%</td>
<td>62%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senator</td>
<td>52%</td>
<td>47%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local Deputy</td>
<td>34%</td>
<td>38%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table elaborated by author with data taken from newspaper sources and from George Grayson, (Washington, D.C.: CSIS, 2004).

This table cannot tell us anything about the universe of PRI senators who wished to become governors and failed, but it does speak to how important an Upper House seat was to future political advancement. Furthermore, it highlights the importance of the legislative path to the governor’s mansion – 52 percent of all governors had been senators prior to winning this office under hegemonic conditions while more almost 70 percent had been deputies.

During the last part of the hegemonic period, the PRI used state nominating conventions with democratically elected delegates to nominate senatorial candidates for plurality formulas. In the non-competitive era, informal practices negated the formal rules. In practice, plurality Senate candidates were chosen directly and imposed on the party by the national leadership, although the preferences of the state-level PRI organizations and sectors were taken into account. In making up the final roster of plurality candidates, different groups within the PRI circulated several lists of possible candidates and from these lists, the PRI presidential candidate and his closest advisors made the final decisions, which were then imposed on the party. In the state nominating conventions, delegates were presented with a single two-person formula (called candidates of unity), and it was exceptional to have more than one formula registered.

Once competition for elected posts began to rise in Mexico during the 1990s, one begins to see changes in informal selection methods for legislative posts. The PRI was the dominant competitor in the Senate until 1988, winning over 80 percent of the national vote.
in the 1970s, but its electoral strength continued to fall during the 1990s, reaching just below 50 percent in 1994, before dropping to under 40 percent by 1997.9

Even after the loss of the absolute majority in the Lower House of Congress in 1997 and into the 2000 elections (in which the President, Senate and Lower House were elected concurrently) the statutory rules for selecting Upper House candidates remained unchanged, and candidates continued to be imposed through undemocratic state delegate conventions. Higher levels of electoral competition did not have an immediate, statute-based decentralizing effect on Senate nomination rules. However, an important transformation occurred in how candidates were chosen informally. Because the PRI governors were expected to play a central role in getting out the vote in their respective states in what promised to be a close presidential race, many now had the political weight to demand legislative candidacies for their political allies, and so were able to negotiate with the national leadership.10 The role of the governors was much commented on in the press during the nomination season in spring, 2000 (Edicrisis, March 25, 2000; Crónica, March 21, 2000; “Indicador Política,” p. 29-A, El Universal, March 20, 2000; “En la línea,” El Universal, March 1, 2000). One commentator states that once the party’s traditional vote-promoters became less important, it was difficult for the party to reach all voters without the help of the state executives (Notimex, April 4, 2000). Another argues that what makes a good candidate for the PRI is first, to have the support of the governors, and second, to be able to defeat the candidates of the next most powerful party in the state (La Voz de Michoacán, March 18, 2000).

Electoral competition became a serious problem for the PRI’s control over the Senate by 2000, and the party reacted by using opinion polls that were representative at the state level to determine which of the potential Senate hopefuls was best known by the voters and which had the best image. The poll results were one of the factors that went into the nomination decisions, and help show that there is a connection between rising levels of electoral competition and more localized recruitment to the Upper House.11 Party leaders were more willing to allow the governors more influence over nominations because in many cases their allies were well-known local politicians, with experience in state politics.12 For the plurality Senate candidacies, belonging to a national PRI faction was no longer the basis of a winning the nomination.
The role of the governors in negotiating Upper House candidacies in return for their work in promoting PRI candidates in elections also speaks to the changing nature of the governors’ role in the Mexican political system. As Garman, Haggard, and Willis point out (2001) Mexico was one of the most centralized federal regimes in the world. Governors under this system were likened to administrators sent down by the president to maintain order (Anderson 1972). Presidents could not only place favored PRI politicians in gubernatorial office, they could also depose them if they were not sufficiently efficient or politically successful. Under more competitive conditions, the governors become far more important political actors (Díaz-Cayeros and Langston 2003; Rodríguez-Hernández 2003). The fact that the state executives are now in a position to bargain with national party leaders over Senate candidacies, even before the loss of the presidency to the PAN in 2000, alludes to their newfound political power.

In addition to PRI governors, groups within the state-level PRI (including those not aligned to the sitting PRI governors) were also able to place candidates by 2000. Most state groups within the PRI are formed around either the governor, former governors, or in some cases, wealthy businessmen who dominate the economic landscape of an important city within the state create them. National level political figures often make alliances with state groups and their leaders, and in return for political support, the state groups can place some senate and deputy candidates.

The following table shows the professional profiles of those PRI politicians who won the right to compete for a plurality Senate slot both before (1982) and after (2000) the on-set of competition. What we see are two types of candidates – one who is based at the national level, in posts such as the federal bureaucracy, the national CEN, or national sectoral leadership positions – and the other who has concentrated his political career in the state political arena in positions such as mayor, local deputy, and those in the state government. Even without new decentralized nomination rules the PRI leaders reacted to the pressures of competition by 2000 and began nominating far more local type politicians. Because governors were negotiating candidacies, and because their favored allies were state based politicians, PRI candidates exhibit far higher percentages of prior posts as mayors, local deputies, and state party leaders, as opposed to sectoral leaders or federal bureaucrats.
Table 2. Candidate Profiles for Plurality PRI Senators, Pre-And-Post Competition.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1982*</th>
<th>2000** and Difference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Federal Deputies</td>
<td>64%</td>
<td>59%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>NATIONAL POSITIONS</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Party</td>
<td>24.5%</td>
<td>12.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Federal Government</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>PARTY SECTORS</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Sectors</td>
<td>46%</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>STATE POSITIONS</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State Party</td>
<td>16.40%</td>
<td>42%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local Deputies</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>33%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mayor</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* *n=61, **n=62. Source: Table compiled by the author from data extracted from the Diccionario biográfico del Gobierno Mexicano, and communication with party members. Figures do not add up to 100% because candidates could have held more than one post before winning the candidacy.

The localist type politicians were connected to either the governor or powerful political groups that operated within the state party affiliates, and they have a great deal of prior experience, meaning they are party insiders who owe their candidacies to the fact that they have operated within the confines of the party organization for years. These changes to the PRI’s Senate recruitment speak to the weight of a federalist system under more democratic conditions. Once politicians are obligated to compete seriously in statewide districts, the PRI turned to more local party alternatives, while still reserving these candidacies for party insiders.

The decision making process and the types of candidates chosen for the closed list proportional seats are different than they are for the plurality races, in large part because winning a PR seat depends on the national vote, not on winning a specific state-wide
district. The candidates for the PR positions in the Senate (which have existed only since
1997) exhibit what one would expect given the lack of direct electoral pressure: party
leaders with more national experience in both the federal government, party posts, and
elected positions who do not wish to chance the turbulent waters of plurality elections. The
PR Senate lists are chosen directly by the party leaders (the PRI’s presidential candidate,
his closest advisors and the president of the party). Here again we see party insiders
winning candidacies; however, these party politicians are party leaders who operate at the
national level, as sectoral leaders, as operators within the party’s national bureaucracy, and
the federal bureaucracy.

After the presidential defeat of 2000, the PRI changed its formal rules for choosing
legislative candidates. As of the 2001 National Assembly, senators could be nominated in
one of two ways: either by a delegate convention (with one or more names on the slate) or
by open state primary. The changes in legislative statutes appear to be driven by the deputy
nominations, which had a spillover effect on the Upper House. The push to decentralize
legislative candidate selection to formally include primaries was a strategic calculation on
the part of one of the contenders to lead the post-2000 PRI, Roberto Madrazo, who needed
the support of the Assembly’s local delegates and the governors who had helped place
them, and so backed a measure to delegate decision-making power to the districts’ voters.
Primaries weaken the national party leadership, but Madrazo was willing to risk this move,
knowing he could finagle the deputy selection rules at a later date.14

However, it is important to note how arbitrary these selection procedures remain. If
there is one established statutory rule in place, all potential candidates know beforehand
who the gatekeepers will be and how best to woo them. If there are two or more possible
procedures on the rulebook, then one is hard pressed to predict which set of “selectors” will
be making the decision. The PRI has refused to reduce the ways in which it can statutorily
nominate candidates to one: this weakens potential hopefuls while strengthening those who
actually decide which procedure will dictate outcomes – the national leadership in the cases
of federal legislative nominations. One is right to be skeptical of the party’s willingness to
depend on internally democratic means to choose legislative candidates.

The PRI originally used its centralized control over ballot access to the Upper
House to control its potentially divisive and ambitious political elite. Party insiders who
had demonstrated loyalty and discipline, and who had strong connections to a national party faction were rewarded by the President with a Senate nomination (and therefore, a seat in the Upper House). The national bias of Senate recruitment began to change once competition at the ballot box endangered the PRI’s hold over the Senate in the late 1990s (after their loss of the majority in the Chamber of Deputies in 1997). The PRI’s leaders in the 2000 selection cycle ran a series of opinion polls to determine which potential senate candidates were more popular with each state’s voters. While the statutory rules did not change until after the 2000 defeat, political realities forced the party to informally decentralize the nomination process to allow governors and state party factions far more influence over selection. Recruitment to the Senate changed as a result: far fewer national politicians were nominated to run for plurality races, while they continued to dominate the high spots of the closed PR list. However, party insiders continue to win Senate nominations for both the plurality and proportional slots, as exhibited by their wide-ranging prior political experience, experience that is won through party controlled ballot access.

While we do not have any direct evidence that more locally based party insiders are actually better able to win more competitive senate elections, PRI leaders certainly believed they were and acted upon this belief. The decentralization of nominations before 2000 and the opening of candidate selection after 2001 have both been the result of growing electoral competition and the increased reliance on governors and state groups to promote the party’s electoral fortunes in the states.

The PAN.

The National Action Party survived outside elected office for close to 40 years. Because it could not participate in national, state, or local government, it developed as a “confederation of state parties with weak national leadership”. As such, its candidate selection rules were highly decentralized and based on the decisions of the party’s rank-and-file (called militants). In this long period in the political wilderness, PAN candidates were without a doubt both party loyalists and constituent servants: there was so little possibility of winning office and so few PAN members that candidate selection was often a round of asking PAN members to sacrifice their time and energy on a losing campaign effort. Because of the rise of electoral competition (and its success in the same), the PAN
eventually changed its rules for choosing both executive and legislative candidates. The entrance of ambitious office-seekers with fewer ties to the party’s organization into the once martyred party caused internal conflicts over candidacies that the long-lived delegate conventions were ill equipped to handle. After its excellent showing in the 2000 elections (both in the executive and legislative arenas), the PAN decided to open and decentralize its selection rules to an even greater extent, but still based these procedures on strict controls on party militants.

PAN Senate candidates who are returned from state elections and not the PR lists are party loyalists, but loyal to local militants who nominated them, not national party leaders. With decentralizing statutory changes, they have become beholden to a wider group of local militants and it is probable that electoral success will create new incentives to create long-term careers within the party. PR senators for the PAN are also party loyalists in that they are national leaders who enter the Senate through the safety of the closed 32 person national list.

The PAN was formed more than six decades ago by businessmen, professionals, and Catholic activists who were concerned about the growing power of the State over the economy in general and the policies of then-president Lázaro Cárdenas (1934-1940), especially his emphasis on socialist education and expropriation of private property (Mabry 1973). In the early days of the party’s existence, it had little or no chance of winning elections in a PRI-dominated playing field, and as a result, the party leadership’s central objective was to “educate” Mexico’s electorate. This was a decision made by one of the founders of the party, Manuel Goméz Morin, who recognized that Mexico’s civic culture was underdeveloped due to poverty, poor education, and the caudillo tradition (von Sauer 1974). The party’s ideology as the loyal opposition in a one-party hegemonic regime was crucial to its survival outside of public or elected office. Especially before the semi-proportional reforms to the Chamber of Deputies in 1963, the party was incapable of delivering almost any selective material benefits to its members and activists as it rarely won elections in the single-member-district (SMD) deputy elections, and for this reason, almost never participated in government, in any branch, at any level. The PAN did not win a senate seat until 1991. It won its first gubernatorial race in 1989.

Mizrahi argues (1996: 2) that as the PAN’s electoral fortunes improved from the
late 1980s and especially into the 1990s, it has been confronted with a dilemma: increased opportunities to win selective office benefits have created tensions within the party as an influx of ambitious politicians has placed pressures on an organization accustomed to losing, not winning. “Vote winning is difficult for an opposition party that traditionally condemned such an attitude and has few institutional mechanisms to regulate the quest for power. Political ambition becomes a threat to the party’s ideological identity and organizational coherence (Mizrahi 1996: 3).” A long-time member of the PAN (who has held federal legislative posts) states that many traditional panistas participated their entire life, not to win posts, but because of a “mission.” There is a natural tendency for party loyalists to feel that now that the party can win on Election Day, they deserve a chance to win a candidacy. During the 1980s and 1990s, many ambitious office seekers stormed the party’s gates, a process which began especially in the North and central parts of the country after the bank nationalization of 1982, and continues to this day. The small and medium sized entrepreneurs from the North and Bajio regions (sometimes known as the Barbarians from the North) had little to no prior involvement in politics but many began to question their passive support of the PRI and search for means to participate in politics, mainly at the local and state levels. The left parties were not an option because of their anti-market ideology, nor was the PRI, which they viewed as corrupt and incompetent. Many of these new panistas are businessmen who are more concerned with good government, understood as producing and delivering public goods and services to the constituents without recourse to clientelist exchange, than with organization building or the party’s traditional ideology of Catholic social action and civic education, and do not spend much time or resources on the party, either before or after winning office (Mizrahi 1994).

While ambitious office seekers with business backgrounds began to win party nominations for mayoral and gubernatorial posts, they were less interested in legislative positions. Many of them wanted to effect change directly in their cities and states, and believed local executive posts were better means to do so. Legislative posts were not seen as desirable for many of the neo-panistas at least during the 1980s and much of the 1990s and Senate nominations were still largely reserved for party loyalists with careers in their respective state parties and with elected experience.

Before 2001, the statutory rule for choosing candidates for governors and senators
was a state nominating convention with delegates. To be a delegate it was necessary to be a militant of the party, and to register oneself in the local Municipal Committee as a delegate and to travel to a central convention location. This type of selection technique was highly decentralized (especially compared to the PRI), and democratic because it is difficult for national party leaders to impose candidates. If a party militant were interested enough in participating, he had the right to be a delegate – they were not elected (as in the case of the PRI) - they were self-selected. It was, however, relatively difficult to become a rank-and-file member (militant) of the PAN, in part because the party wanted to make sure its ranks were not filled with priistas trying to subvert the party, and in part because the educational mission of the party required well-indoctrinated members. Mizrahi (2003) argues that the PAN more closely resembled a sect than a political organization, and the purpose of controlling entry to the party was to maintain its political ideology against the ever-present hegemony of resources and political posts that the PRI had to offer. The rules to become a PAN militant have changed over time, but in general, an interested citizen must be sponsored by a party member, must take a series of training classes, and must wait at least six months before being admitted to the PAN. Once he has done so, he must also keep current in his quotas and attend party meetings to maintain his rights as a militant. The PAN also keeps close tabs on members through their local organizations, and the states’ membership lists are considered largely accurate (completely unlike the PRI or PRD). Thus, party nominations are based on the militants, but this rank-and-file membership is closed and closely monitored.

Under competitive conditions in the 1990s and onward, a seat in the Upper House of Congress for a panista can mean one of three things: first, if one is running in a state in which the party has no electoral possibility, the politician is committing a strategic sacrifice, knowing he will lose the race, and expect future benefits for having helped the party fill a candidacy. Second, if the state is competitive for the PAN, and the politician is competing in a plurality race, then he is an ambitious up-and-comer at the state-level, and probably not a party leader at the national level. Finally, if the panista is running for a high-level PR position, he is most likely a ranking member of the National Executive Committee (CEN) or a distinguished legislative leader. A position at the bottom of the PR list is either punishment for irresponsible or undisciplined behavior, or a sacrifice.
The reasons why a PAN politician would wish to win a candidacy can vary. However weak the Senate may be as a policy making body, it continues to be a sought-after post. Again, there is a governor-senator dimension in the PAN. First, as is the case of the PRI, the Senate is used as a step-ladder to the governor’s mansion, and second, an unsuccessful, but well-fought run in the state executive race (that raises the party’s vote share above its historic average) can lead to a run for the Senate, especially for a plurality seat because it denotes that the PAN politician is popular among state voters.

Table 3. Prior Legislative Experience of PAN Gubernatorial Candidates.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Federal Deputy</td>
<td>44%</td>
<td>27%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senator</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>21%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local Deputy</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table elaborated by author with data taken from newspaper sources and from George Grayson, (Washington, D.C.: CSIS, 2004).

The electoral situation in which the party was situated for so many decades in large part explains the localist nature of PAN senate candidates for plurality races up to 2000. Unfortunately, we do not have professional background data on PAN candidates for the Upper House from pre-competitive period as we do for the PRI, but one could expect to see candidates with far less prior electoral experience than their PRI counterparts, as the party could barely win access to the Lower House of Congress, municipal posts, or state government positions before the 1990s.
Table 4. Prior Experience, PAN Plurality Senatorial Candidates, 2000-2006.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fed. Deputies</td>
<td>54.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Loc. Deputies</td>
<td>34%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nat. Exec. Com.</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Council</td>
<td>29%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State PAN</td>
<td>59%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State Council</td>
<td>27%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Losing Candidates</td>
<td>17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Municipal Pres.</td>
<td>24%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>City Council</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*n=41; Sources: ¿Quién es quién? (1999), Secretaría Nacional de Capacitación, CEN/PAN.

Given the information at hand, one can see the strength of the state political career paths. By state careers, we mean those that are based in experience as a mayor, local deputy, in municipal and state government. Those who have become plurality candidates for the Senate as exhibited by these politicians’ profiles, demonstrate that many have been leaders and members of the state and municipal parties, and even more importantly, have lost elections for the party’s cause. Almost 60 percent (58.5) have been members of the state party organizations. This speaks to the “loyalist” nature of the Senate candidates for the PAN. Very few Mexicans except for party insiders would have been interested in holding such a post, especially up to the mid 1990s, except for those most interested in the party’s long-term mission. As in the PRI, the legislative route is highly important, with 54.5 percent of all senate candidates in the 2000-2006 periods having been a federal deputy prior to becoming senator. Many senators (34 percent) have been local deputies. What is most interesting is that there does not appear to be two separate career paths, one from the local level and the other from the federal, as in the PRI. Rather, even many national figures within the party begin their careers at the state level. This is no doubt true because of the historic lack of electoral opportunities in the federal government due to the PRI’s continued control of the presidency between 1930 and 2000.

For members of Acción Nacional as for other parties, it is necessary to keep moving
among different legislative and executive posts, both elected and appointed, simply because of the no-consecutive reelection clause, which makes any sort of career building within one institution of government impossible. In general, the Senate is an excellent post from which a *panista* can become better known to his colleagues, make policy if he is so inclined, and prepare for future positions.

The PR Senate lists exhibit a different set of political actors, especially of course, those who are placed in the ten to thirteen highest spots on the closed 32 person list (and thus expected to win a spot). The formal statutory rules again admit the participation of the state conventions, which each choose a single name to be included on the PR list (PAN Statutes and *Reglamento*; both can be found at the website [www.pan.org.mx](http://www.pan.org.mx)). These 32 names are sent up to the National Council (with about 300 members) and listed alphabetically. Then, each Council member votes a list with 10 different names. The top 32 vote-winners are placed in order of the number of votes received, except for three positions in the top ten places that are reserved for the CEN’s preferences, which usually mean the best-known party leaders are usually chosen. There is no doubt that the PAN leaders winning high level positions in the PR list are party loyalists and they will go on to lead the PAN’s delegation in the Senate, as some have already done in the Chamber of Deputies. Of the top ten names in the 2000 list, eight have been federal deputies, and seven have been or were now members of the CEN in 2000, higher percentages than those found in the plurality candidacies.

Even during the 2000 candidate selection process, there were indications that certain party leaders were interested in “opening” the candidate selection processes of different elected posts. The President of the CEN of the PAN, Luis Felipe Bravo Mena announced that the party should modernize the party via candidate selection reform after the 2000 selection cycle. One newspaper article stated around this time, “The PAN is going through a series of conflicts that threatened the unity of the party as a consequence of the tense conventions that were producing very close results in the internal elections.” (*El Sureste de Tabasco*, February 2, 2000). Delegate nominating conventions became a problem for the PAN during the course of the 1990s. First, more militants were interested in participating in choosing a candidate for governor or senator who might actually go on to win the election, and this caused the number of delegates to grow, making conventions
more difficult to manage. Second, as mentioned above, party outsiders began to interest themselves in PAN candidacies (candidates for the PAN do not have to be militants, but voting delegates do).\textsuperscript{21} This began to cause a far greater amount of conflict within the party as neo-panistas flooded the party searching for candidacies for elections that were now possible to win.

While no party likes to admit to factional infighting among the ranks, the PAN does exhibit definite group formation, and these groups began to compete fiercely to place candidates in the Senate. The final reason why party leaders contemplated candidate selection reform was to dissipate some of this local feuding and place the onus of selection on a majority of militants in each state. Both local and national factions exist in the PAN, and many local groups have connections to national factional leaders. However, the local groups are far more active in selecting senate plurality candidates than their national counterparts. These state groups were once defined by similar ideological splits as those on the national level, and later by their willingness to negotiate with the PRI-dominated regime under Salinas or support for Fox as a presidential candidate. It now appears that present-day local groups are not formed on an ideological basis, but rather, around personalities and the search for posts and political space within the party (Wuhs, 2002).

Because these local groups have incentives to fight over candidacies, opening up nomination procedures was seen as a way of dampening conflicts by taking the choice away from the most dedicated militants in the convention setting that was more easily manipulated by different group leaders and involving more of the state’s rank and file in an atomistic closed party primary. Party statutes must be changed in a party assembly, and 18 months after the PAN’s stupendous set of victories in July 2000 (including the presidency, governorships, and the highest national vote that had ever reached for both Houses of Congress), the party’s leadership and a part of the rank and file met to revise the statutes. However, candidate selection was not the only problem on the table, and one should understand these specific reforms in light of a larger drive to bring to party closer to the population (without reverting to the traditional patron-client practices of the PRI). First, there was a push to create 1000 municipal sub-committees that would be responsible for bringing the party closer to the voter, a recurrent problem for the PAN because it has refused to increase its membership base to massive proportions. Changes were also
considered in making it more difficult for politicians from other parties to enter the PAN and participate. However, external candidates are still permitted, but regulated by the CEN.\textsuperscript{22}

Many different types of changes to candidate selection methods were considered going into the 2001 party assembly: for example, at first, the PAN planned to alter the statutes only for governors, and not senators. The party also disputed opening the internal primaries to all registered voters, PAN militants and sympathizers, or just militants (\textit{Reforma}, December 13, 2001; \textit{Notimex}, December 8, 2001). Each of these different procedures would have had different consequences in terms of participation, as well as the type of candidates selected. If the party had opened up the selection to all registered voters, the candidates for the party might be more popular with the median voter, but might not represent the ideals of the party.\textsuperscript{23} If the PAN kept the voting confined to the militants, but expanded the number of voting stations in which they can participate, the value of being a party activist would be maintained, but more members of the party could participate.

In the 2001 party assembly, the PAN chose to reform its rules moderately. Only militants can vote in these internal elections, but there are two important changes. First, militants do not have to register themselves as delegates with their municipal committees, and second, the state or national party has the option to place either one voting station (in which case, the militants would not have to pre-register, but would still have to travel), or the party could set up several voting stations instead of a single convention location, in which case, the internal selection is basically a closed party primary.

The PAN has reformed its statutes to better handle the exigencies of electoral competition and holding government office. The decision base of the party continues to be the militants, but the practical difficulties of participation have been eased. The new dilemma for the party under non-consecutive re-election laws is to choose candidates who are popular with the electorate at the same time they have some identification with the party’s principles, and will thus act congruently with them once in power. Because no senators will be chosen under the new rules until 2006, it remains to be seen if these different goals can be met. In terms of types of candidates, clearly the PAN’s candidates are loyal to the party’s rank-and-file as long as they want to continue a political career and not return to private life after their term in office is finished. As Mexico’s democracy
develops, long-term political careers within the PAN are increasingly possible and attractive, which could continue to change political recruitment within the party

*The PRD.*

The PRD is a center-left party born of a PRI split and the marriage of several small fractious left parties at the end of the 1980s. It had very little opportunity to win Senate seats, except for those from the proportional representation list (which was first introduced in the 1997 elections). In practice, plurality Senate seats were seen as impossible to win, so these types of selections during the 1990s did not cause internal ruptures (as did nominations for mayors in certain PRD states, or candidacies to the PR lists for the Lower House of Congress). During this same period, the party used both conventions and party primaries to choose candidates to the Senate. After the 2000 electoral disappointment, the PRD chose to reduce the number of nomination options to one: party primaries in which both party members and sympathizers can participate – in essence, open primaries. Of the three parties, the PRD candidates are most closely identified with their constituents because of the open primaries, but it is the party least likely to win Senate races.

The Party of the Democratic Revolution was born out of a rupture of the PRI-regime during the presidential succession of 1986-1988, and achieved an electoral miracle by almost defeating the PRI candidate, Carlos Salinas in the 1988 presidential elections. Cuauhtemoc Cárdenas, together with other distinguished members of the regime, left the party his father helped build, and ran for the 1988 presidential election under a coalition banner (the National Democratic Front - FDN), which included a number of small Left parties and leaders of social movements (Garrido 1993). A good number of these organizations would go on to form the PRD in 1989. The manner in which the PRD was born: out of a coalition of leftist parties and ex-PRI members, in a battle in the electoral arena against the giant official party, is believed to have marked the PRD as an organization (Bruhn 1997, Prud’homme 1995). Because of the massive fraud that distinguished the 1988 presidential battle, successive PRD leaders had to negotiate between using the electoral arena to gain political space, or automatically questioning the validity of negative electoral results in post-electoral street protests (Eisenstadt 2003; Meyenberg 2004). Elections were both means to win political objectives, such as the control over government
office and legislative weight, as well as a means to mobilize supporters against the authoritarian regime (Prud’homme 1995). Vote winning was not the only measure of support for the PRD, as it would be for parties operating in more democratic nations. Furthermore, the enormous popularity and charisma of the PRD’s perennial presidential candidate tended to outshine the party’s electoral and organizational efforts at other levels of government (Meyenberg 2004: 53).

The coalition that formed the ranks of the PRD would create a propitious environment for internal group formation (Bruhn 1997:136). For the first few years after the birth of the PRD, three groups circulated within the party’s leadership: former members of the PRI, social activists who base were social organizations, and members of leftist parties that joined the new party. Leadership posts and candidacies were given to each of these groups in the first stage of party consolidation, and in subsequent years, the constellation of forces within leadership posts would change as different groups grew stronger (Prud’homme, 1995: 24-31).

Finally, the fact that the PRD was born of a rejection of the extremely vertical decision-making structure of the PRI would lead to a search for democratic rule-making procedures, which allowed for a great deal of internal democracy on one hand, and a difficult party to lead on the other. Bruhn writes, “(t)he PRD’s attempts to develop internal democracy, while they brought many benefits to the party, also lay at the heart of some of its most serious weaknesses, including its inability to cope with internal divisions and its difficulty in institutionalizing or legitimating party rules (1997: 169).” During the early stages of party development in the 1990s, nomination rules gave two options when choosing candidates for elected posts: either the direct vote of the militants, or a convention of democratically elected delegates. Internal party primaries, while by far the most ‘democratic’ decision-making tool, caused as many problems as they solved. First, it was difficult and expensive to set up voting booths, even at the state level. Second, party primaries tended to cause serious splits in the organization because, much like the case of the PRI, it was difficult to assure compliance with internal procedures that regulated the primaries and so candidate hopefuls had strong incentives to subvert these internal elections. However, conventions of elected delegates were also divisive, especially in a party characterized by such strong group identification. Bruhn (1997) argues that
conventions allowed leaders more influence, as they were able to organize voting blocks, which then gave all group leaders incentives to do the same.

After 1997, the electoral world changed for the PRD. After the dismal performance of Cárdenas in the 1994 presidential elections, the Ingeniero - as he is known by supporters - demonstrated his popularity once again with millions of voters when he vanquished his foes from the PRI and PAN in the first elections ever held for Head of Government (jefe de gobierno) for the Federal District. Not only did Cárdenas do well, he was so strong in the national media outlets that his city-level campaign helped elect peredistas from all over the country to the Federal Congress. After the victory of 1997, the PRD was an electorally viable party. This fact would make candidate selection and office winning ambition within the party a far greater problem – much as it was for the PAN – than it had been when there was little hope of victory at the ballot box. However, because the PRD continues to be weaker in many states than the PAN, many of the Senate candidate battles took place among the national factions over who would win a high spot on the PR list. Since 1997, the factions have become even more antagonistic as there are more selective benefits over which to fight. It seems that increased office-seeking ambition has been channeled through the already existing party factions. These groups are not divided by ideology, and many of the leaders come from the groups formed within the party in the early 1990s.24 Their leaders battled over the presidency of the CEN in 1999, creating a disaster in terms of the party’s external image, as the top two finishers disputed the outcome. This would mark the Senate selection cycle in 2000 as some leaders and militants became more wary of the price (literally and figuratively) of internal democracy and the party’s leadership began to impose some Senate candidates for reasons of political expediency.

The routes to power in the PRD, as in all parties in Mexico, are a series of jumps among different elected, leadership and government posts because of the non-consecutive reelection clause. Even some of those who have been senators would rather return to the Chamber of Deputies than remain out of office (Proceso, April 2, 2000). Many established party leaders have come up through the Chamber of Deputies, while maintaining seats on the CEN. Younger members of the party are now winning posts in local congresses, especially the Assembly of the DF (this in large part because the party is so strong in the Federal District) and then attempting to win candidacies in the Lower House. Candidacies
are usually won because of one’s membership in a faction.

Table 5. Prior Legislative Experience of PRD Gubernatorial Candidates.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>n=17</td>
<td>n=51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Federal Deputy</td>
<td>59%</td>
<td>39%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senator</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>27%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local Deputy</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>16%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table elaborated by author with data taken from newspaper sources and from George Grayson, (Washington, D.C.: CSIS, 2004).

From this table, we see that having been a senator was an important post to quest for the gubernatorial nomination for almost a third of those peredistas who ran for a state house after 1995. Having been a federal deputy was even more helpful, probably because senate posts were so difficult to win, and because so many of these PRD gubernatorial candidates had little chance of winning the election. Nonetheless, when comparing the weight of a legislative seat in becoming a gubernatorial candidate, one sees many similarities between the PAN and the PRD: 16 percent of the PRD candidates had been local deputies while 15 percent held that post for PAN candidates. 27 percent of the PRD state candidates had been senators in the competitive era, while 21 percent of their PAN counterparts had held the same position. More PRD state candidates had been federal deputies (39 percent) before running for the state house than in the PAN (27 percent) but in a data point not shown in the table, more PAN nominees had been mayors (37 percent) than those in the PRD (16 percent).

Until the late 1990s, Senate plurality seats, even those for the first minority party, were seen as largely unobtainable. This is a large difference with the PAN, a party that was able to place 24 of 32 first minority positions in the Upper House in 1994, the first time that first minority seats were distributed. Because the PRD was the most likely third place finisher in many states, the state party organizations could fight over their senatorial candidacies without the outcome making a large difference for the party in terms of overall...
vote winning. However, after the 1997 mid-term elections, the PRD had risen to become the second electoral force in some states, as measured by the 1997 federal deputy results.\textsuperscript{25} The PRD had the highest vote in the 1997 mid-term deputy elections in the Federal District, Michoacán, and Morelos. It came in second in several others, especially in the southern states.\textsuperscript{26} The PRD also did very well in the State of Mexico, Tamaulipas, and Tlaxcala. This puts the once-unreachable Senate on the map, so to speak, in terms of career paths of party members.

Because of the hope of winning either the state (and so placing the two person formula in the Senate) or the first minority in these states (to place only the first name in the binomial ticket), one should have expected conflict over candidate selection in them. In fact, the candidate selection process of Campeche, the Federal District, Estado de Mexico, Michoacán, and Morelos were striking examples of internal discord, and the willingness of the CEN of the PRD to reduce internal democracy to win Senate slots.\textsuperscript{27} In some more competitive states, the CEN leadership can ignore the preferences of the state party affiliates and impose external candidates that have a better chance of boosting the party’s Senate vote in that state (\textit{Notimex} March 20, 2000).\textsuperscript{28} The National Council (the oversight body of the party’s CEN) has the statutory right to place external candidates in up to 20 percent of all candidacies. Furthermore, when the National Council decides to enter into an electoral alliance with another party in a specific state, the internal selection process is suspended, even if a candidate has already been chosen.\textsuperscript{29} While the statutes dictate that the candidates for the plurality races were chosen either in state conventions by a direct vote of the militant bases or in an open primary, in those states in which there was a better chance to win the plurality vote, the PRD leadership played a much larger and more intrusive role in candidate selection.

As is the case for the PAN and the PRD, the PRD has differentiated nomination strategies for the binomial plurality races and for the PR list. The PR lists for the Senate demonstrate a similar tendency to those of the PAN and the PRI: the party’s leaders (and the strongest party loyalists) win high positions on the list (in the case of the PRD, in the top eight). In both the federal deputy and senate PR lists, each of the four most important \textit{corrientes} or groups within the party at this time, Jesus Oretega’s, Amalia García’s, Mario Saucedo’s and Héctor Sánchez-Félix Salgado Macedonio’s, fought over the final
distribution of what is considered the true prize of the PRD, the plurinominanal closed PR list. Of the 14 places on the PR list (out of 32) that the PRD had negotiated for itself with its alliance, half of them were chosen in the National Council and the other half in the National Convention (El Financiero, March 24, 2000). However, the lists that were panted by the National Convention were thrown out, and a new list was negotiatted (Proceso, April 2, 2000).

The PRD’s changing patterns of candidate selection from the creation of the party in 1989 until the 2000 elections demonstrate how both the organizational realities of factionalism and the opportunities and challenges presented by electoral competition have affected which kind of party politicians wins a nomination to the Senate. Because of the inclusion of social organizations, former PRI members, and small left partisans, candidates to the legislative posts have often been determined by the individual’s inclusion in one of the national factions. As the PRD’s ability to win votes rose in several states, intra-party competition for elective posts rose as well, as was filtered through the prism of factions and the external alliance needs of the national CEN. In the case of the Senate, candidate selection is differentiated between the binomial plurality and PR forms of electoral representation. Both local and national factions fight to place their allies into the first spot of the two-person ticket because the PRD still cannot win the state-wide vote in most states, and so only the first name in the ticket will win a seat under the first minority standard. As the party has become more viable in electoral terms, the national leadership has stepped in to impose some external candidates on state party affiliates. This speaks to a difficult dilemma for the PRD; there was a specific decision on the part of two party leaders in the mid to late 1990s to dedicate more of the party’s energies to winning elections instead of mobilization. As a part of this strategic turn, external candidates (normally from the PRI) have been welcomed into the PRD as candidates, as have been enormously successful in strengthening the party in states in which it was very weak. External candidates were also welcomed into the legislative arena, and have caused problems as party loyalists complained bitterly. As one would expect, national factions fight to place their members for a high-level placement in the 32 person closed PR list.
V. Conclusions.

In this paper, which has focused almost exclusively on candidate selection as a dependent variable, we have tried to understand the reasons why the parties’ candidate selection rules were formulated in different ways in the first place, and discovered that there is a strong link between the organizational life of the party under hegemonic conditions and the specific forms that nominations took under the three parties. Second, because of Mexico’s democratic transformation, we have made a question of the issue of why parties (and their leaders) change statutory rules or informal practices over time and argue that a transformation of the external electoral environment has had an enormous influence in changes to rules and practices: the PRI was forced by the possibility of losing their 70 year old majority in the Senate to allow its governors and state groups to place party politicians with state based careers in candidacies, although the party did not change its formal statutory rules until after the 2000 defeat. It will be interesting to see whether the once-hegemonic party in facts uses a strategy that differentiates among different states in nominating Upper House candidates in the 2006 elections (as it did at the district level in the 2003 deputy nominations). The PAN, a party with decentralized nomination rules and strict controls over membership, saw internal conflict over selective benefits rise with its increasing success at the ballot box. In reaction, the party chose to decentralize further, instituting closed party primaries, while maintaining high barriers to entry into the party. Finally, the PRD is still buffeted by the winds of competition and change: internal democracy, one of the party’s bases, has cost the organization dearly, both in terms of finances and internal unity, and as the center-left party becomes more viable in certain states, the CEN leadership has been willing to impose candidates to assure a better electoral outcome. In the 2000 nomination cycle, in some states in which the PRD was expected to do well, party leaders took control of the selection process away from the state affiliates and imposed better known external candidates.

Morgenstern and Siavelis hypothesize that different kinds of candidates result from distinct types of selection and that candidate selection can affect their relative success at the ballot box. The Mexican cases shed light on these different relationships: for the PRI, party loyalists with career paths based in national politics are no longer considered good contenders for Senate plurality races. National party and sectoral leaders do continue to
win high-level spots in the 32 personal closed list, however. The governors and state party factions negotiated the senate candidacies with the national party leadership in 2000 (as they did in both the 2000 and 2003 single-member-district deputy candidates as well). This informal decentralization of nominations still produced candidates who were party loyalists, as evidenced by their career backgrounds. Party careers based in the state political arena give the Senate candidates enough exposure to do well in statewide districts.

For the center-right PAN, decentralized democratic state nominating conventions – whose electors were devoted party militants – had by and large chosen party loyalists to fill their Senate plurality candidacies. The 2006 senate candidates will most likely be chosen in closed party primaries, forcing Senate hopefuls to lobby the state party militants in order to win a first or second place spot in the binomial ticket. It remains to be seen whether well-known party loyalists will be able to overcome a poor showing by a PAN presidential candidate. The PRD has been willing to use external candidates to raise its senatorial profiles in certain states, even above the complaints of its state party affiliates, leading one to believe that the national leadership has serious concerns about the electoral viability of its state party loyalists, at least in more competitive states in which the party does not hold the governorship.


De Luca, Miguel, Mark P. Jones, Maria Inés Tula, "Back Rooms or Ballot Boxes? Candidate Nomination in Argentina, Comparative Political Studies, Vol. 35, No. 4, May 2002, pp. 413-436.


Wuhs, 2002.
1 For an important exception, see Bejár (2004).

2 For more on the relation between the formal candidate selection rules of the hegemonic PRI and its informal practices, see Langston (2001).

3 In the electoral reforms of 1993, the PAN and PRI negotiated a reform to allow more representation in the Senate. In each state, a first minority senator would be elected, meaning that the second place party in each state would be allowed to place the first name from their two person formula in the Upper House. Under this reform, the PRI essentially handed over 32 senators to the opposition, with the PAN being the winner, because it was the second force in most states at that time. These 1st minority senators were first seated in the 1994 elections, while a later reform created the 32 PR seats for the Senate.

4 Mexico’s Lower House holds 500 representatives, 300 of whom are elected in single-member districts and 200 from closed lists that are made up of five regional districts that elect 40 members each.

5 Re-election is totally prohibited for gubernatorial and presidential posts. Politicians for other posts can be re-elected to that same position after a term out of office.

6 In January 2000, the Consejo Político Nacional, a deliberative body of the PRI, decided on delegate conventions. The actual requisites for the candidates that came out in March were so specific that only one possible candidate could be chosen. Finally, the Commission for the Internal Process had to ratify the candidacies, so the CEN had another break on any rebellion on the part of losing pre-candidates. Only after all these steps did the delegates to the conventions actually vote on the candidates.

7 Interview with Pedro Ojeda Paullada, former president of the CEN, March 1996, Mexico City. Senators, except for two mid-term elections in the 1990s, are always chosen concurrently with the presidential elections, and so the PRI’s presidential nominee was fundamental in the selection process.

8 Interview with Hector Hugo Olivaures, former secretary of elections, CEN, February 2000.

9 In 1997, only PR senators were elected.

10 Both former leaders of the PRI, Dulce María Sauri and Humberto Roque Villanueva, report that by 1997, even before the PRI had lost the presidency, PRI governors had a great influence in choosing deputy candidates. Interviews with the author, September 10, 2003 and November 17, 2003, respectively.
The PRI and the government had been conducting opinion polls for gubernatorial candidate selection for many years. Interview with the former president of the CEN of the PRI, Mariano Palacios Alcocer, June 18, 2003.

Questions included, among others, how well the potential candidate was known, whether he/she had a good, regular, or bad image, how much he was concerned with the constituents, and whether he was honest.

The PRI holds three large peak level associations: the Popular, the Peasant, and the Workers’. Each of these three sectors is made up of local, state, and national and national unions, depending on the industry or service involved.

For example, for the 2003 federal deputy candidate selection cycle, in those districts in which the PRI runs in alliance with another party, candidates were not chosen under the primary rule, but rather negotiated informally between the sitting PRI governor (if there was one) and the national leadership. Because the president of the CEN has many gubernatorial allies, he was able to place a good many supporters in the Lower House. The CEN also dictates the names on the plurinominal lists, which make up 40 percent of the Chamber of Deputies.

PAN statutes all the CEN the prerogative to approve or veto any candidate. See Reveles (2004).

The 1963 electoral reforms were designed to give the opposition parties representation in the Lower House of Congress even if they did not win a single SMD race (there was no proportional representation at this time). If a party won more than 12.5 percent of the national vote, it would be awarded seats in the Lower House, and addition seats above 12.5 until reaching 20. This limit was raised to 25 in 1973. In the 1958 federal deputy elections, the PAN won 6 seats in Congress (of 171 seats), and in 1961 it won 5 (of 178). After the 1963 reform, it would win the 20 seats allowed under the new law until 1973, when the legal upper limit was set at 25 Lower House seats (Sartori 1976: 233).


The statutory rules for choosing the presidential candidate had been changed prior to the 2000 race from a vote of the party’s National Council to a closed party primary (Reveles 2004).

Only 41 of 64 plurality candidates were found.
Reveles (2004) notes that there were two separate career paths in the PAN during the 1990s; one that formed in the states around local elective posts, especially municipal presidents, and the other that was made up of national legislators who had won their positions through PR representation. The author states that the local panistas were more confrontational with the PRI regime, while the national leaders were more willing to negotiate with the President over electoral reforms.

The party’s CEN has the right to approve all outsider candidates.

The National Assembly of December 2001 was based on prior consultation with the rank and file in Regional Forums organized by the party. The party’s members were also consulted using internet and opinion polls. The PAN set up a commission to present a reform agenda which was present by the CEN and approved by the National Council (Bejar 2004).

If the PAN opened up the selection, then they should choose better candidates – those capable of winning elections. The problem for the PAN is how to make sure the candidates running for the party are panistas at heart and that they will govern with the best interests and ideals of the party once in power. Because there is no consecutive reelection, the voters are judging the party’s past performance, not just the elected official who is leaving office, or the candidate for the position. Interview with Rogelio Carbajal, President of Fundación Rafael Preciado, a PAN think-tank, March 9, 2004.

Meyenberg (2004) argues that while Cárdenas’s leadership remained strong, there were no real factions working within the party because all group leaders had to pay homage to the party’s caudillo. Once Cárdenas’s power began to wane after the 2000 electoral disaster, true factions began to emerge that were not beholden to his overarching leadership.

After the poor electoral results of 2000, the PRD lost its advantage in many states.

The southern states included Campeche, Chiapas, Guerrero, Hidalgo, Oaxaca, Quintana Roo, Tabasco, and Veracruz.

See El Universal, April 4, 2000 for more on Campeche. For conflicts in the state PRD in the State of Mexico, see Expediente Político, Abril 1, 2000. In the state of Morelos, a pre-candidate, Manuel Leví Peza, left the PRD because he did not win the Senate candidacy. He joined the PRD in 1998 to work for the mayor of Morelos and participated in the consulta cuidadanoa as a precandidate to the Senate spot, but he lost to
Graco Ramírez Garrido. He charged that the CEN had electoral preferences that always fall to friends and collaborators. *La Unión de Morelos*, April 1, 2000.

There were complaints from PRDistas about who would be put in the first place of the formula in Veracruz, an important state with a strong PRD presence. Arturo Herviz won the internal election in the state for the PRD on the 27th of February, but the PRD wanted to put Dante Delgado of Convergencia party, a PRD ally, in the first spot.

Article 15 of the PRD’s statutes.

For more on the local factions, see Bruhn (1997) and Sánchez (1999) and on national factions, Meyenberg (2004: 59) and Sánchez (1999).